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ABSTRACT: This research provides an overview of the evolution of 
the jihadist in cyberspace, focusing primarily on the impact of the emer-
gence of Web 2.0, and the subsequent shift towards ‘lone wolf’ terrorism. 
The primary focus of this section is on al-Qaeda, due to its role in estab-
lishing the use of electronic medium to communicate widely jihadist mes-
sages. Therefore, by no means does this section attempt to present itself as 
a truly exhaustive review of the relationship between cyberspace and ter-
rorism; however, it does provide a broad conceptual understanding of this 
evolving relationship. The following section provides a discussion of how 
IS leverages the power of social media, focusing on how the activities of 
soft-sympathizers create an echo-chamber which allows for IS’ messages 
to dominate the so-called ‘Twittersphere,’ as these messages are repeated, 
thus becoming somewhat normalized. This soft-power strategy, in contrast 
to its military campaign, can be understood as an attempt to normalize and 
legitimize IS’ existence. Finally, this paper concludes by offering thoughts 
on how IS strategy can be undermined through both governmentally or-
ganized, and grassroots campaigns of counter-messaging, aided by allies 
within the Islamic world and Muslim civil society.
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ÖZ: Okuduğunuz bu makale siber ortamda yer aldığı şekliyle cihatçılık 
kavramıın evrimini gözden geçirmektedir. Bu çalışma bu kavramın Çeçen 
savaşı döneminden gelen köklerinden bugün IŞİD tarafından sosyal med-
yada kullanımına kadar üç önemli paradigm değişikliğinden geçtiğini öne 
sürmektedir: (1) daha ilkel Web 2.0 platformları ve cihatçı forumların
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ortaya çıkışı (2) daha ileri seviye Web 2.0 ve sosyal medya platformları-
nın cihatçılığı yaymanın yöntemleri olarak ortaya çıkması (3) ‘yalnız kurt’ 
terörizmine doğru kayış. Yazar makalesinde IŞİD’in kendisine doğrudan 
üye olmayan, yalnızca sempati besleyerek IŞİD liderliğinin ürettiği ve izin 
verdiği twitlerini retweet eden muhiblerine yaslanıyor olmasının çığır açıcı 
olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Ayrıca, IŞİD’in kendisine resmen üye olmayan 
bu muhibleri güçlendirme stratejisinin siber ortamda cihatçılığın evriminde 
bir üst aşamaya geçiş olduğunu ve IŞİD’in böyle yaparak sosyal medya 
platformlarında ‘IŞİD anlatısına’ hakimiyet sağlama yoluyla kendi varlığı-
nı normalleştirmeyi ve meşru hale getirmeyi amaçladığı savunulmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: İslam Devleti, Sosyal Medya, El-Kaide
Introduction
On the eve of the Scottish Independence referendum, an operative from 
the Islamic State’s (IS) al-Furgan media production unit, using the Twitter 
handle @With_baghdadi, advised his followers that al-Furgan would soon 
be releasing a new video. The video, entitled Lend me Your Ears, showed 
kidnapped British photojournalist John Cantlie discussing British foreign 
policy and his captivity. Within minutes of being uploaded to YouTube, 
another propaganda operative, identified as Abdulrahman al-Hamid, asked 
his 4,000 Twitter followers to inform him of the highest trending hashtags 
on Twitter in the UK: 
“We need those who can supply us with the most active hashtags in the 
UK. And also the accounts of the most famous celebrities. I believe that the 
hashtag of Scotland’s separation from Britain should be first” (as quoted in 
Malik et al., 2014).
Replies from his followers advised using #andymurray, #scotland, #Vote-
No, #VoteYes and #scotlandindependence when retweeting the video in or-
der to raise the video’s profile and exposure (as quoted in Malik et al. 2014). 
Al-Hamid urged his followers to “work hard to publish all the links,” while 
@With_Baghdadi asked his to “invade [the #VoteNo hastags] with video 
of the British prisoner” (Malik et al., 2014). These interactions between 
IS operatives in Iraq and Syria, and its soft sympathizers – non-combatant 
supporters in the West – demonstrate the importance of these supporters to 
the dissemination of IS’ message. Ultimately, the support of IS by Western-
ers on social media strengthens the legitimacy of IS’ newly founded cali-
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phate by intimating that that support for this caliphate is greater and more 
widespread than would otherwise be believed if the mainstream media was 
the only avenue informing the public on IS. 
In recent months, Western governments have been growing, and continue 
to grow increasingly concerned about the upwards of 3,000 foreign fight-
ers travelling from Western countries, such as the United States, Canada, 
Great Britain and Australia, to Iraq and Syria to swell the ranks of the 
IS.1 Of equal concern is the possibility that these fighters will return fur-
ther radicalized, battle-hardened, and influenced by extensive radical net-
works, and that they may then be more likely to commit terrorist attacks 
in their home countries (“Islamic State crisis,” 2014). The recent attack on 
the Jewish Museum in Brussels – allegedly by a returned foreign fighter 
from Syria – seems to confirm that these fears may be founded in reality 
(“Brussels Jewish Museum killings” 2014). Moreover, the prospect of in-
dividuals at home becoming radicalized by online propaganda and electing 
to engage in ‘lone wolf’ attacks at home, such as the Ford Hood shooting, 
or more recently the attacks on soldiers in Canada is of similar concern for 
intelligence officials and policymakers. 
However, while these scenarios represent serious threats which clearly 
must be addressed, they have largely overshadowed discussions about the 
role and impact of soft-sympathizers in the West in propagating IS’ mes-
sage. Therefore, while recognizing the problem of radicalization of indi-
viduals at home, and that of foreign fighters, this paper will attempt to re-
dress the current lack of exploration of IS’ social media strategy to explore 
the role and impact of soft-sympathizers in the Western world. Specifically, 
it will focus on how these supporters further disseminate IS’ messages, 
and what strategic function they fulfill. In order to provide an appropriate 
analysis of this ongoing and highly dynamic phenomena, this research pro-
vides an overview of the evolution of the jihadist in cyberspace, focusing 
primarily on the impact of the emergence of Web 2.0, and the subsequent 
shift towards ‘lone wolf’ terrorism. The primary focus of this section is 
on al-Qaeda, due to its role in establishing the use of electronic medium 
to communicate widely jihadist messages. Therefore, by no means does 
this section attempt to present itself as a truly exhaustive review of the 
relationship between cyberspace and terrorism; however, it does provide 
a broad conceptual understanding of this evolving relationship. The fol-
1  The figure of 3,000 foreign fighters was proposed by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator Gilles de 
Kerchove (“Islamic State crisis,” 2014). One hundred and thirty Canadian citizens have joined ISIS according 
to early 2014 estimates by the Canadian Government (Public Safety Canada, 2014).  In early September 2014, 
US defense secretary Chuck Hagel confirmed that over one hundred US passport holders were fighting for 
ISIS (“Hagel Confirms,” 2014).
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lowing section provides a discussion of how IS leverages the power of 
social media, focusing on how the activities of soft-sympathizers create 
an echo-chamber which allows for IS’ messages to dominate the so-called 
‘Twittersphere,’ as these messages are repeated, thus becoming somewhat 
normalized. This soft-power strategy, in contrast to its military campaign, 
can be understood as an attempt to normalize and legitimize IS’ existence. 
Finally, this paper concludes by offering thoughts on how IS strategy can 
be undermined through both governmentally organized, and grassroots 
campaigns of counter-messaging, aided by allies within the Islamic world 
and Muslim civil society. 
1. Jihadists in Cyberspace: A Brief Overview
Poor understanding of the early history of jihadi presence online is in large 
part due to the fact that, by the time cyberspace began to attract the atten-
tion of security agencies and scholars, jihadist groups’ use on the Internet 
had already proliferated (Weimann, 2006).2  
Early attempts by jihadists to leverage the Internet, included the 
establishment of azzam.com, which is self described as “an independent 
media organization providing authentic news and information about Ji-
had and the Foreign Mujahedeen everywhere” (Awan and Al-Lami, 2009: 
56). This is generally cited as the very first authentic Jihadist website. The 
emergence of Azzam.com, along with the Islamic Media Centre and alne-
da.com, during the First Chechen War (1994-1996) and other nascent pe-
ripheral conflicts, aimed to “transmit a version of events different from that 
offered by the mass media from the other side of the battlefield” (Thomas, 
2003: 120). Having recognized that conventional media could easily be 
censored or filtered by governments, (Thomas, 2003), Chechen jihadists 
instead turned to e-mail distribution lists to transmit their message, uncen-
sored and unfiltered, quickly to a highly targeted audience. In other words, 
the Internet allowed jihadist groups to explain their actions without the 
constraints of traditional media, thus offsetting both censorship and con-
demnation (Thomas, 2003). 
Whilst the jihadist presence in cyberspace remained limited until early 
2000s, these websites laid the groundwork for the ascendancy of more so-
phisticated and interactive uses of the Internet in this century.
2  Evidence suggests that terrorist groups, irrespective of ideology, were quick to embrace the power of the 
Internet to pursue their strategic objectives. In fact, in 1998, fewer than half of the 30 groups designated as 
foreign terrorist organizations by the US State Department under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996 maintained websites. By the end of 1999, nearly all designated organizations had established 
an Internet presence (Weimann, 2006). 
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1. 1. The Emergence of Jihadist Forums
The generation of an explosion of interactive content, and the connected 
user participation – allowed for by the emergence of early Web 2.0 capa-
bilities and rudimentary online forums – meant users not only passively 
consumed online content but also activity contributed to its creation (War-
ren and Leitch, 2012; Hoeren and Vossen, 2009). The increased popularity 
of general interest online forums coincided with increased participation 
in jihadist forums, with a 2005 study uncovering upwards of 4,300 active 
jihadist forums (Weimann, 2006). 
Awan and Al-Lami (2009) attributed the move away from traditional web-
sites, and the concurrent exponential growth of online forums, to the shift-
ing security paradigm in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. In the 
months following the attacks on New York City and Washington, various 
groups of hackers engaged in complex campaigns to disrupt jihadist web-
sites.3 Similarly, law enforcement agencies ramped up their scrutiny and 
prosecution of Jihadist online activities.4 This sustained assault led to the 
realization of the necessity of decentralizing the jihadist presence online 
in order to ensure the continuity of the messaging. Therefore, in an effort 
to counter the “systemic disruption or removal of important jihadists web-
sites,” the transition was made from traditional websites to online forums 
in a conscious effort to delegate “responsibility … to a suitable large and 
diffused body of anonymous web users” (Ibid: 57-58). 
Despite shifting to online forums, the production of jihadist media re-
mained highly hierarchically organized and strictly regulated. In fact, in 
the aftermath of the mid-2000 invasion of Afghanistan, senior leaders of 
al-Qaeda increasingly sought to provide readily accessible information 
about the organization, its membership, ideology, and strategy, in order to 
compensate for its reduced capability to commit successful acts of terror 
(Brachman, 2014). This rhetoric remained inherently one-directional, as 
avenues for interaction between the global following and al-Qaeda’s sen-
ior leadership were limited: messages were produced, disseminated and 
received, but no formal feedback mechanism was built into the process. 
In other words, “users on these forums were often more akin to traditional 
3  Alneda.com was famously hacked and defaced with the words “‘Hacked, tracked and now owned by the 
USA” by American porn site owner Jon Messner for five days in August 2002 before the site’s administrators 
managed to regain control. (Awan and Al-Lami, 2009: 57). Similarly, between 2002 and 2003, the Internet 
Haganah, a self-described “global intelligence network dedicated to confronting Internet activities by Isla-
mists and their supporters, enablers and apologists,” shutdown more than 600 sites it claimed were “linked 
to terror” (Awan and Al-Lami, 2009: 57-58). The Internet Haganah also engaged in a campaign requesting 
American based Internet Service Providers to shutdown sites of concerns.
4  A notable example was the arrest and subsequent extradition to the United States of Babar Ahmad, the 
creator of azzam.com, under the UK Terrorism Act (Awan and Al-Lami, 2009). 
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categories of passive media consumers that appeared inimical to the revo-
lution in audience roles heralded by Web 2.0” (Awan and Al-Lami, 2009: 
59). 
1. 2. The Transition to Web 2.0
The paradigm shifted again with the emergence, and growing populari-
ty, of increasingly sophisticated Web 2.0 platforms, namely file-sharing 
portals and social networking sites (Conway, 2012). The al-Qaeda Core 
leadership based in Afghanistan and Pakistan maintained a considerable 
amount of control over its narrative through its media groups, but in ad-
dition to this, al-Qaeda affiliates such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) began 
utilizing this new media environment to disseminate downloadable con-
tent such as magazines, video and brochures. This paradigm shift, is best 
embodied by the media strategy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and AQI in the 
interregnum between the demise of Web 1.0 and the fully-fledged Web 2.0.
The release of a thirty-minute recording by al-Zarqawi explaining who 
he was, why he was fighting, and providing details of the attacks he and 
his groups were responsible for, heralded the start of al-Zarqawi’s media 
offensive in early 2004 (Conway, 2012).  Paul Eedle described the record-
ing as an example of a “comprehensive brand statement” aimed at gaining 
brand-recognition (Eedle, 2005: 124-125) and notoriety within the jiha-
di community.  Capitalizing on this newfound recognition, AQI released 
a video depicting al-Zarqawi beheading the American civilian contractor 
Nicholas Berg (Conway, 2012). This video, entitled Abu Musa’b al-Zarqa-
wi slaughters an American, was uploaded to ogrish.com, a popular shock 
site, and was – as a result – viewed over 15 million times (Talbot, 2014). 
In the wake of such successful propaganda campaigns, the power of vid-
eo-sharing websites, such as YouTube, was increasingly recognized by 
jihadists as a novel arena, and an easy-to-access platform, for the dissem-
ination of propaganda, and raising of funds for future operations.  Aided 
by the popularity such mediums,5 and the fact that no Arabic language 
skills or high level of Internet literacy were now required to locate jihadist 
content, YouTube specifically rapidly became a significant platform for 
Jihadist groups and their supporters, fostering a thriving subculture which 
used it to communicate and share propaganda worldwide. A 2008 study 
analyzed the users’ comments on YouTube videos depicting suicide oper-
ations in Iraq, finding that the majority of viewers resided outside of the 
5  YouTube was established in February 2005 as an online repository for sharing video content. According to 
YouTube, on average more than one billion users watch about six billion hours of video footage every month. 
Every minute, 100 hours of new videos are uploaded (Weimann, 2014: 10).
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Middle East and North Africa, with the largest percentage located in the 
United States (Conway and McInerney). This led to the conclusion that 
Jihadist media was now “spreading far beyond traditional Jihadist web-
sites or even dedicated forums to embrace, in particular, video sharing and 
social networking – both hallmarks of Web 2.0 -- and thus extending their 
reach far beyond what may be conceived as their core support base in the 
[Middle East and North Africa] region to Diaspora populations, converts, 
and political sympathizers” (Conway and McInerney, 2008: 10). 
The dissemination of jihadi messages outside of dedicated forums was, 
nonetheless, not entirely welcomed by all jihadist media organizations. A 
case in point is Al-Boraq Media’s September 2006 publication of a detailed 
policy paper entitled Media Exuberance, which sought to curtail the pro-
liferation and production of unattributed Jihadist media. They feared that 
unpolished and unprofessional content by “scattershot individuals posting 
jihadist media materials without the sanction of a recognized” jihadist me-
dia group undermined the credibility of Jihadist media and diverted atten-
tion from official sources (Kimmage, 2008: 5). 
1. 3. The Shift Towards ‘DIY Terrorism’
Despite the aforementioned opposition from some jihadist media groups, 
al-Qaeda strategists, such as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, nonetheless quickly 
recognized the importance of the decentralization of their operations. No-
tably, in 2004, al-Suri penned his Call for a Global Islamic Resistance, 
in which he decried the hierarchical model of al-Qaeda as outdated and 
vulnerable, espousing instead the advantages grassroots leaderless resist-
ance (Bousquet, 2011; Michael, 2013). Al-Suri’s strategy of individual ji-
had, best illustrated by the activities of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP). 
Another highly important paradigm shift, largely dependent on the power 
of the Internet, occurred with the 2010 AQAP launch its widely distrib-
uted English-language online magazine titled Inspire, which encouraged 
individual jihad against Americans and Westerners (Michael, 2013). With 
slick production values and graphics, Inspire mixed ideologically driven 
material with pragmatic instructional and skill-building content in an ef-
fort to fostering a do-it-yourself approach to terrorism (Lemieux et al., 
2014). Moreover, this emphasis on a do-it-yourself ethos targeted at an 
English-speaking readership is an “especially interesting development in 
Inspire that set it apart from other examples of the al-Qaeda propaganda” 
(Lemieux et al., 2014). Through a section entitled Open Source Jihad, In-
spire attempted to increase the motivation of individuals in the West, while 
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lowering skill-based barrier that had previously hampered individuals at-
tempting to carry out successful terrorist attacks. For example, one issue 
detailed how to conduct a random shooting in a crowded restaurant, while 
another instructs readers how to weld blades to the front of a pick up truck 
to “mow down the enemies of Allah”6  (Michael, 2013: 55).
The production of Inspire magazine is, in many ways, the incarnation of 
the strategic vision of Anwar al-Awlaki, a popular,7 American born, on-
line cleric affiliated with AQAP whose sermons were widely distributed on 
YouTube. Al-Awlaki is also credited with inspiring a number of terrorist 
plots and attacks.8 According to Brain Jenkings (2011), Al-Awlaki and In-
spire led to a fundamental shift in al-Qaeda’s strategy from organization-
ally-led jihad, towards do-it-yourself terrorism. Similarly, Jarret Brachman 
(2014) claims that al-Awlaki and AQAP made do-it-yourself terrorism, and 
its participants, the focus of their media efforts, rather than conceptualizing 
al-Qaeda’s sympathizers as merely an audience. A change in the nature of 
terrorism, whereby terrorist organizations such as AQAP can motivate and 
empower individuals to commit acts outside of any chain of command, 
according to Bruce Hoffman (2010), represents a change in the nature of 
terrorism itself. 
As a result of this paradigmatic shift, online jihadist activity came to have 
standing in its own right. A 2012 article on electronic jihad, posted on the 
leading jihadist forums al-Fida and Shumukh al-Islam, stated that:
“[A]ny Muslim who intends to do jihad against the enemy electronically, is 
considered in one way or another a mujaheed, as long as he meets the con-
ditions of jihad such as the sincere intention and the goal of serving Islam 
6  A similar tactic, minus the blades, was employed in the West on at least three occasions: In 2006, Moham-
med Taheri-azar injured nine people with a sports utility vehicle on the campus of the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill (Spencer, 2010);  On 22 May 2013, a British Army solider was run over with a car 
before being stabbed and hacked to death by two converts to Islam in the southeast of London (The “Return to 
old-style terror,” 2013).; and more recently, a Canadian solider was killed and another one injured after being 
deliberately struck by a car driven by a convert who had previously expressed a desire to travel to Iraq to fight 
with ISIS (Woods, 2014). This tactic embodies the essence of ‘do-it-yourself’ terrorism, as it “offers terrorists 
with limited access to explosives or weapons an opportunity to conduct a homeland attack with minimal prior 
training or experience” (FBI, 2010),
7  A 2009 British government analysis of YouTube found 1,910 videos of al-Awlaki, one of which had been 
viewed 164,420 times (Weimann, 2014). Similarly, in 2008, his popular lecture Constants on the Path of Ji-
had was available on ummah.com, a mainstream site that received at the time approximately 48,300 visit per 
month from the US alone (Meleagrou-Hitchens, 2011).  
8  Al-Awlaki is believed to have been in contact with at least two of the 9/11 hijackers. He is also credited 
with inspiring or directing a number of other terrorist attacks: the failed 2008 Times Square bombing; the 
2009 shooting inside the Fort Hood military base; the failed 2009 “underwear bomber;” and a failed 2010 
bombing attempt involving a parcel bomb hidden inside a printer in the cargo hold of a passenger jet (Wei-
mann, 2014). Moreover, Roshanara Choudhry, a Muslim student jailed for attempting to murder British MP 
Stephen Timms in May 2010, claimed that she was radicalized after listening to Awlaki’s YouTube videos 
(Weimann, 2014). 
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and defending it, even if he is far away from the battlefield” (as quoted in 
Weimann 2014, 4).
Similarly, Muhammad bin Ahmadal-Salim’s 39 Ways to Serve and Par-
ticipate in Jihad extolled “performing electronic jihad” as a “blessed field 
which contains much benefit” (Awan et al 2011: 56). Given the belief that 
participation in indirect jihad is seen as both a required and effective form 
of resistance and participation in current times, the call for electronic jihad 
inevitably did not remain unanswered in the wake of the Syrian Civil War.
2.  The Use of Social Media by IS
As highlighted by Lewis (2014), the military victory of IS represents only 
one part of the equation in establishing its caliphate. The key battle for IS 
is not solely military and achieved by violence, but also includes the for-
mation of “the practical basis of a society” (p. 11-12). In order to achieve 
this social objective, IS relies on the dissemination of its message to foster 
support both domestically and abroad through a uniquely effective social 
media strategy.
Although all sides of the Syrian Civil War have adopted the use of social 
media, the use of social media by IS appears to have generated far more 
attention, and consequently has been more successful than others. In addi-
tion, whilst various terrorist organizations, such as AQAP and Al Shabaab, 
have maintained Twitter accounts since 2010, they often did so as a second-
ary means of communication.  The bulk of content was instead available 
on extremist forums, featuring downloadable content such as magazines, 
videos and brochures. In contrast, the distribution of information almost 
exclusively on Twitter, has allowed IS to quickly reach a large audience. 
Therefore, the dissemination of its ideology, and the advancement of its 
long-term objective, namely the legitimization of the consolidation and 
expansion of territory, has occurred more successfully than it might other-
wise have done (Friedland, 2014).
In order to frame its message, IS has developed a range of exceptionally 
professional and sophisticated communication and social media initiatives 
that are exceptionally easy to access and highly attractive to their audienc-
es. On 5 July 2014, IS media group Al-Hayat Media released in numerous 
different languages (including Albanian, English, French, and German) 
the first issue of its online magazine Dabiq,9 a publication reminiscent of 
9   Dabiq is a town located in north Syria and is mentioned in a hadith describing events of the Malahim (Ar-
mageddon) where the greatest battle between Muslims and the crusaders takes place. In other words, Dabiq 
represents a story of Muslim unity against the Romans (Saltman and Winter, 2014) 
62 Güvenlik Çalışmaları Dergisi     18 (1)
Inspire magazine (Cambhir, 2014). Each issue reaffirms “key themes, stra-
tegic exploits and ideological constructions, as well as speech from [IS] 
leaders” (Saltman and Winter, 2014; 39). In addition, they also contain 
powerful photographic imgery of IS’ military and state-building endeavors 
such as: images of wounded Iraqi Security Force soldiers; the distribution 
of food and water by IS fighters in regions under its control; victorious 
parades of militants in invaded cities; the destruction of Shiite and Sufi 
shrines; and the execution of prisoners and members of religious minori-
ties (Styszynski, 2014). Similarly, IS produces high-quality videos, which 
have thus far included The End of Sykes-Picot, The Flames of War, The 
Clanging of the Swords I-IV, and Upon the Prophetic Methodology, which 
romanticize the daily lives of IS fighters. Punctuated with cinematographic 
effects, such as instant replays and slow-motion shots, these, often feature 
length, videos “appear to be something from a Hollywood action film or a 
video game” (Vitale and Keagle, 2014: 9).
The development of a highly sophisticated media strategy which relies 
upon the decentralized nature of social media, particularly Twitter, has 
allowed for the mass dissemination of IS’ multitudinous products. While 
content is created under the direct guidance of IS strategists, dissemination 
relies upon sympathizers at the grassroots level. Therefore, the message 
of IS’ communications remain strategically unified despite dissemination 
being ‘crowd sourced.’ This extensive reliance on soft-sympathizers either 
re-tweeting or re-posting content produced and authorized by IS leadership 
has “no clear precedent” (Barrett, 2014: 51). For example, on the day Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of the Caliphate, IS began 
circulating pictures of his speech before a video of the speech was up-
loaded several times on YouTube. The links to these YouTube videos were 
then uploaded on the widely popular file sharing website justpaste.it prior 
to being Tweeted by IS to tens of thousands of sympathizers. These sym-
pathizers, in turn, re-tweeted the links and more importantly, copied and 
uploaded links to, and the video itself, using various different accounts. 
These new links were then added to justpaste.it and Tweeted again, in a re-
petitive manner (Barrett, 2014). This strategy, aimed at gaining maximum 
exposure and overcoming YouTube’s attempt to suppress IS propaganda, 
has shown its efficiency on many occasions. Another pertinent example 
of this strategy in action, showing “the ease” and “speed with which IS is 
able to spread its message” (Barrett, 2014: 52), is that of the film Flames of 
War. After two days of having been uploaded, one randomly selected page 
– amongst dozens of others promoting the video – had recorded 18,034 
views within just a seven-hour timeframe. 
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Moreover, to further its strategy of crowd-sourced dissemination, IS affil-
iates developed an Android application called The Dawn of Glad Tiding10 
to enable users to keep up with the latest news about the activities of the 
Islamic State. Vitally, the application also allows IS’ main communication 
branch to send Tweets periodically from the accounts of everyone who has 
installed the application, thereby flooding social media with IS propaganda 
without triggering Twitter’s spam-detection algorithms (Berger, 2014). The 
Dawn of Glad Tiding first went into wide use in April 2014, but reached an 
all-time high of almost 40,000 tweets on the day IS marched into Mosul 
(Vitale and Keagle, 2014).
In addition, IS sympathizers also routinely engage in systematic ‘hashtag 
hijacking,’ manipulating Twitter to magnify IS’ message. Hashtag hijack-
ing involves the repurposing of popular and/or trending hashtags by adding 
those hashtags into unrelated Tweets as a means of infiltrating conversa-
tions. In order to increase the visibility of their messages, IS sympathizers 
co-opted World Cup hashtags such as #Brazil2014 or #WC2014, and, as 
mentioned earlier, hijacked Tweets relating to the Scottish Independence 
referendum (Vitale and Keagle, 2014). Utilizing popular and trending 
hashtags in conjunction with IS’ own hashtags such as #theFridayofsup-
portingISIS, #Thought_of_a_Lone_Lion and #AmessagefromISIStoUS, 
increases the exposure of the message. This strategy allows for a message 
which has effectively been crafted by only a handful of IS propaganda 
agents to be disseminated by thousands of sympathizers in order to reach 
millions of Twitter users. In fact, in the period between 17 September and 
17 October 2014, the activities of IS supporters resulted in 4.1 million 
Retweets (Barrett, 2014).
2. 1. Implications of IS’ Social Media Strategy 
Although there is nothing new in violent extremist groups quickly adopt-
ing new technology, what has hardly any precedent is the breadth of the 
communication strategy implemented by IS. Not only does IS use new 
technology to create the content which it releases, it also utilizes new tech-
nologies innovatively in the dissemination of that content. This strategy 
has, until now, been only sparsely covered in terrorism study literature. 
That being said, communications scholar Henry Jenkins’ (2006) notion of 
convergence culture provides a useful theoretical framework to analyze the 
impact of IS tactics. 
10  The Dawn of Glad Tiding was available through the Google Play store prior to its removal for violating 
Google’s terms of service.
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According to Jenkins (2006), convergence culture whereby “old and new 
media collide, where grassroots and corporate media intersect, where the 
power of the media intersect, where the power of the media producer and 
the power of the media consumer interact in unpredictable ways” (p. 2), is 
not a technological change. Rather, it is the embodiment of a social change 
where media consumers no longer passively consume material, but also 
engage in the creation of virtual communities, combining their collective 
intelligence and resources to achieve a defined purpose. The fundamental 
innovation of IS’ media strategy is this exploitation of the collective re-
source which is its Western followers. 
Fundamentally, IS recognizes that the majority of Western supporters will 
never engage in kinetic actions such as terrorist acts in their homelands, or 
fighting abroad. Instead, IS utilizes these supporters for the purpose of dis-
seminating information and propaganda relating to their cause. Arguably, 
not requiring Western supporters to engage actively in terrorist acts, allows 
IS to garner the participation of these supporters without asking them to 
cross moral boundaries they might not feel comfortable crossing. This per-
fectly embodies Brachman’s notion of jihobbyists. Brachman (2008) con-
tends that the rise of Web 2.0 allowed individuals who have largely driven 
their own radicalization without direct assistance, training, or support “to 
move forward the Jihadist agenda” (p. 19)  
In addition to increasing the exposure of IS’ message, these disseminators 
also seek to move forward this jihadist agenda by aiding IS to gain rec-
ognition and acceptance. In other words, they are actively engaged in an 
attempt to normalize IS’ narrative. IS media strategy can be understood in 
terms of soft power projection. While some of IS’ propaganda is clearly 
aimed at intimidating Western audiences with depictions of atrocities and 
human rights abuse, these intimidation tactics have been punctuated with 
imagery of genuine state-building exercises. These images include the de-
piction of IS’ engagement in administrative functions. Particularly relevant 
examples include: the enforcement of sharia law through the establishment 
of a religious police force; the establishment of religious schools; the dis-
tribution of food; and reconstruction projects (Lefler, 2014).  The aim of 
these depictions is the advancement of the notion of the Islamic State as 
a legitimate state in order to gain long-term support of the local populace. 
This is of critical importance to IS in its attempt to socialize the Muslim 
world to the ideas and values of the Islamic State.  
In order to socialize its global Muslim audience, the mass dissemination 
of IS’ carefully crafted message seeks to dominate the narrative. The cre-
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ation of an echo chamber amplifies and reinforces its messages through 
transmission and repetitions whilst also drowning out competing views. In 
order words, by ensuring that its narrative is louder than that of its oppo-
nents, IS’ sophisticated use of social media creates an impression of large 
legitimate online support, which exceeds the actual reality. Whilst videos 
of beheadings and other atrocities have gained tremendous profile, pos-
sibly more important is the positive narrative created by IS videos which 
depict a unified community were pious men police the streets eliminating 
drugs and making sure everyone prays together. This offers a sharply ide-
alized contrast to most states in the Middle East, where aging autocrats are 
seen to preside over irredeemably corrupt and stagnant governments, and 
can arguably be seen as IS’ greatest success.  
Despite IS’ impressive social media strategy, its narrative remains vulner-
able to challenges. Echo chambers are typically present within closed sys-
tems, such as online forums, which are hermetically sealed from divergent 
perspectives. However, Twitter in itself is not a closed-system. As such, 
whilst any open system may be open to domination by a series of ‘loud 
noises’, this domination of narrative is only temporary and can be chal-
lenged by various competing views, which in this particular case weaken 
the ‘absoluteness’ of IS’ message. Among these challenges the satire from 
within Muslim world has been particularly effective in slowly eroding the 
absoluteness of the IS narrative. For example, the Burn the IS Flag cam-
paign, seemingly started by Muslims outraged by the actions of IS, has 
been trending on Twitter under the hashtags #BurnISISFlagChallenge and 
#BurnISIS. Based on the ALS Ice Bucket Challenge, the movement features 
people posting photos and videos of themselves burning IS’ banner and 
then challenging their friends to follow suit (Palmer, 2014). Similarly, the 
US State Department’s launch of a tough and graphic counter campaign, 
uses IS’ own images of barbaric acts against fellow Muslims in propaganda 
which counters IS’ narrative. The corner stone of this counter-campaign 
is a video entitled Run – Do Not Walk to ISIS Land, which tells poten-
tial recruits that they can learn “useful new skills” such as “blowing up 
mosques” and “crucifying and executing Muslims,” in a sarcastic attempt 
to illustrate the appeal of joining IS, whilst also offering an alternative to 
IS’ seductive message (Logiurato, 2014). 
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Conclusion
As demonstrated in this paper, IS relies on a global network of dissem-
inators to promote its material. Instead of a single source acting as the 
monolithic voice of the organization, multiple messengers collaborate to 
communicate its message thus lending the appearance of authenticity and 
wide acceptance. It also creates a huge problem for the people attempting 
to curb the spread of ISIS’s messages. Blocking multiple offending users 
as they pop up become a challenge, and squashing violent statements on 
Twitter brings up questions regarding free speech that are as yet unan-
swered. Moreover, relying exclusively on the administrators of social me-
dia platforms to effectively limit the spread of IS ideology through account 
closures and suspensions is unreliable at best. In this era of instantaneous 
global communication it is, for the most part, futile to close or suspend ac-
counts unless this is nested within a wider, comprehensive anti-propaganda 
effort designed to neuter IS domination of the narrative. 
Perhaps the biggest mistake in the ‘War on Terror’ was the belief that the 
destruction of Al-Qaeda’s training camps and leadership would lead to the 
demise of the group, its affiliated movements, and its ideology.  In the same 
way that Islamic State’s land grab is impressive, if shocking, the group’s 
online actions have been even more deeply troubling. The pervasiveness of 
its ideology and message means that defeating the group will require more 
of Western governments than a simple military response in Iraq, or even 
elsewhere in the Middle East: the message itself needs effective counter-
ing as well. Western countries need to use an integrated, coordinated, and 
synchronized approach, with support from allied countries in the Islamic 
world and Muslim civil society more generally, in order to accomplish 
such a goal.  
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